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RELEASE OF ONE JOINT TORT-FEASOR IS A
RELEASE OF ALL-COVENANT NOT TO SUE
CONSTRUED TO HAVE SAME EFFECT AS RELEASE
Plaintiffs brought an action for fraud and deceit in connection
with the sale of stock for $2500 to two of the defendants and work
performed by plaintiff for defendant company. When the matter
was at issue in the trial court, defendant Howell, in consideration
of $1500.00, entered into a covenant not to sue with plaintiffs whereby the covenant could be pleaded as a defense in any further suit
on the matter. The covenant expressly reserved the plaintiffs' right
to sue the other defendants. Howell then filed a stipulation to dismiss without prejudice. The other defendants presented the covenant to the court who permitted them to amend their answer,
move for summary judgment, and granted the motion. On appeal,
the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. Held: The release of
one joint tort-feasor is a release of all. The same is true of a covenant not to sue which goes beyond the agreement not to sue to the
point where it has the effect of a release. Price v. Baker, 12 Colo.
Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 157 (1959).
Historically the rule that the release of one joint tort-feasor is
a release of all harks back to the indivisibility of the wrong. The
rule originated in property 'law, thence to contract law, and, as an
already accepted concept, it was made a part of tort law.1 In tort
law the inseparability-of-the-injury concept has been broadened to
the extent of including joint, concurrent, or successive torts. 2 In
order to abate the harshness of the release rule whereby the unwary plaintiff lost all rights when he entered into a partial settlement with one or more of the defendants, the courts early recognized the covenant not to sue which was an agreement for a consideration between the plaintiff and one or more defendants to not
sue those defendants. 3 The covenant not to sue was not a defense
to suit by the plaintiff, but if the plaintiff after covenanting sued
the defendant
the latter could in turn sue the plaintiff for breach of
4
covenant.
The plaintiff has the right to sue one or all joint-tortfeasors for
the injury. It is the plaintiff's choice as to whom he will sue, and
it is assumed that he will sue for total damages sustained. Thus, if
the plaintiff chooses to release one or more joint tort-feasors who
are each legally liable for the whole damage, the law holds that he
who pays for the injury has paid for all and there is nothing left
for which the other tort-feasor can be liable. Even if the release
contains a reservation of the right to sue the remaining tort-feasors,
it is held that the plaintiff no longer has a right to reserve and the
reservation clause is void.5
The traditional viewpoint, upheld by the majority opinion in
the instant case, i.e. that the release of one joint tort-feasor releases
1 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (1943).
2 Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956).
3 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (1943).
4 Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wash.2d 310, 111 P.2d 1003 (1941).
5 Roper v. Florida Public Utilities Co., 131 Fla. 709, 179 So. 904 (1938).
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all, has several advantages, viz. (1) the rule is certain and unequivocal, (2) it has been upheld by the Colorado courts, 6 and (3) a
covenant not to sue if properly drawn is allowed. 7 Oftentimes the
contract is ambiguous, and there is confusion as to whether it is a
release or a covenant not to sue. The distinction is technical, and,
according to the traditional viewpoint, adheres to the party's exact
wording rather than to his intention.8 The courts have held that the
determination of whether or not the contract is a release or a covenant not to sue is a question of law for the courts to decide.9 It is a
jury question as to any wrongful obtaining of the release which if
found would negate the release and allow a continuance of the
cause of action.' 0 It is also a jury question as to whether or not the
plaintiff has received accord and satisfaction from the released tortfeasor that would preclude the plaintiff's suit of the other tortfeasors.11
The majority opinion states that several cases relied upon by
the plaintiff herein are in jurisdictions where contribution among
joint tort-feasors is allowed.' 2 It is contended that since contribution is not allowed in Colorado, these cases are not persuasive here.
Other jurisdictions who rule as Colorado on contribution have held
that allowing a compromise settlement between one or more of the
joint tort-feasors and the plaintiff is no bar to a cause of action
against the other tort-feasors. 1 The only party to be benefitted by
the majority ruling is the tort-feasor who refuses to compromise
with the injured party. The covenant not to sue can have real
meaning only if it effectively enables any party willing to compromise to avoid litigation and alleviates the14 plaintiff's fear of a partial
settlement being held as full satisfaction.
The modern viewpoint, voiced by the dissenting opinion, advocates examining the contract in the light of the party's intention
and the compensation that he receives. The party's intention should
govern the interpretation of the contract. If the party intended to
reserve a right to sue the other tort-feasors, the cause of action is not
extinguished by the release of one or more tort-feasors. Legal hairsplitting required to obtain the exact intrepretation of the contract
is avoided, and a release is construed as a covenant not to sue if
there is a reservation of right against the other tort-feasor. 5 The
plaintiff cannot receive compensation for his injury more than one
time, and the amount contributed by the compromising party, if not
understood as a full satisfaction to the plaintiff, is credited to the
6 Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956).
7 Walling v. Warren, 2 Colo. 434 (1874).
8 Roper v. Florida Public Utilities Co., 131 Fla. 709, 179 So. 904 (1938).
9 Gillette Motor Transport Co. v. Whitfield, 186 S.W.2d 90, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Richardson v.
Pacific Power & Light Co., I1 Wash.2d 288, 118 P.2d 985, (1941).
10 Roper v. Florida Public Utilities Co., 131 Fla. 109, 179 So. 904 (1938).
11 Matheson v. O'Kane, 211 Mass. 91, 97 N.E. 638, (1912).
12 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (1943); Louisille Gas & Electric v. Beaucond, 188 Ky. 725, 224
S.W. 179 (1920); Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958); Judson v. People's Bank and Trust
Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
13 Grondquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954).
14 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (1943).
15 Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 444, 66 N.E. 133 (1903); Grondquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d
159 (1954).
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other tort-feasor.16 In a recent case the tort-feasor had the burden
of proving that a general release without an express reservation of
right to sue other tort-feasors was a discharge of all tort-feasors.7
The traditional rule, which represents a diminishing minority
viewpoint, was revoked in an American equity court in 182218 and
in an English court in 1892.19 It has also been repudiated by legal
scholars who describe it as a relic of common law procedure.2 0 Dean
Prosser recommends that the plaintiff's cause of action should survive until he intentionally releases it or receives full compensation. 21 The Restatement provides that a reservation of the right to
in a release agreement be construed as a covsue other tort-feasors
22
enant not to sue.
Progress, logic, and fair play stand with the modern viewpoint
as against consistency and certainty with the traditional rule. The
author believes that departui e from ancient technicalities will bring
necessary relief to such cases as 'he instant one. Tennessee, Washington, and Florida are the only remaining jurisdictions which support the majority opinion's ruling. It is time for Colorado to join
the modern view and overthrow its archaic rule.
Joyce Cocovinis
16 Louisville Gas & Electric v. Beaucond, 188 Ky. 725, 224 S.W. 179 (1920).
1T Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958).
18 Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 444, 66 N.E. 133 (1903).
19 Duck v. Mayer, 2 Q.B. 511 (C.A. 1892).
20 4 Corbin, Contracts, If 931-35 (1951); Prosser, Torts, § 46 (2d ed. 1955).
21 Prosser, supra note 20.
22 Restatement, Torts, 1 885 (1939).
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